Benito Mussolini’s Theatre of Fascism

The murder of Benito Mussolini on 28 April 1945 marked the end of Italian Fascism’s 26-year regime. Il Duce had been elevated to heights of popularity unparalleled since the days the Risorgimento and Giuseppe Garibaldi, yet the dictator’s fate in the small village of Giulino di Mezzegra represented an ignominious demise for the Italian ‘Sun God’.

The success of the Fascist movement can be attributed to its fundamental ability to evolve in response to Italian popular opinion. Mussolini was adaptable in his continuation of the long-held practice of transformismo politics. However, he differed from his Liberal predecessors in his political focus. Italian politics was no longer solely restricted to the conservative elite and landed agrari, for the Fascist regime sought to consolidate its position through propaganda aimed at a mass audience. Hence Italian Fascism represented a series of facades, masking the political, economic, social, and military inadequacies that marked the dictatorship from its inception in 1919 and ultimately secured its end.

Coming to Power

Perhaps the foremost example of the reactionary tactics adopted by Mussolini and Italian Fascism can be seen in their transition across the political spectrum between March 1919 and October 1922. The lack of a definitive political ideology allowed the Fascist organisation to adapt to the continually altering Italian political climate that existed in the aftermath of World War I. The Fascio di Combattimento, or Combat Group, that was established in Milan did not represent a political party, but merely a movement of sporadic revolutionaries who were dissatisfied with the status quo. This burgeoning band of militants, whose main constituent body was composed of the recently demobilised Arditi, expressed radical social ideals and believed that they would occupy the extreme left wing of Italian politics. Mussolini’s editorship of Il Popolo d’Italia enabled the radical-nationalist-socialist group to voice its opinion to a mass audience. However, in the elections of 1919 the Fascists performed dismally, gaining only two per cent of the vote in Milan, and Mussolini began to search for alternative means of gaining support and political influence.

Socialist uprisings and violence in September 1920 gave the Fascists an ideal opportunity to show their vitality and dynamism, and their attacks on socialist workers attracted conservative industrialists. In arguably the most important political shift of his career, Mussolini realised that power could only be achieved by appealing to the Italian fear of socialism. He adopted increasingly right-wing views, dropping both anti-clericalism and republicanism in September 1921, and began to isolate Fascism’s minority of socialist members, whilst local leaders or Ras such as Italo Balbo, Roberto Farinacci and Dino Grandi established control within rural areas of northern and central Italy.

The expanding Fascist movement began to attract all sections of society, many of whom had been harmed by the militant socialist federterra or those whose economic prosperity had been curtailed due to impositions placed on them by Socialist councils. Fascist anti-socialism had genuinely created a popularist mass movement, transforming Mussolini’s political prospects in the process. The ideological volte-face that was undertaken by the Fascist Party from 1919 represented willingness to sacrifice, and indeed an absence of, core values and beliefs in an effort to gain power.

By 1921 the Fascist use of squadrismo had crushed socialist power in many areas of northern Italy, winning enormous support from the Italian public. Faced with an unknown and unstable political entity, Liberal politicians such as Giovanni Giolitti attempted to absorb the Fascist Party into the government coalition in accordance with transformismo politics. However, emboldened by the electoral success of May 1921, in which the Fascists won 35 seats, Mussolini refused to enter parliament unless he was appointed Prime Minister. Amid threats of Fascist violence and the possibility of civil war, King Victor Emmanuel II invited Mussolini to form a government on 29 October 1922. Yet the threat of Fascist violence, although perhaps genuine, was certainly not realistic. A Fascist Congress was held on 24 October in Naples where Mussolini and the four Quadrumvirs, Balbo, Emilio de Bono, Cesare de Vecchi and Michele Bianchi, met to discuss the grand gamble that would secure Fascist power. In stark contrast to the intended ‘glorious March on Rome’, a mere 10,000 of the proposed 50,000 Fascist Squadristi assembled at the designated locations. Faced with utter defeat, Mussolini had organised an escape route to Switzerland in the event of failure, a fact that demonstrates the level of Fascist confidence in the movement. Yet at two o’clock on the morning of 29 October 1922 Mussolini received a telegram from King Victor Emmanuel II requesting his presence. Only at this moment did Mussolini emerge from the comparative safety of the northern countryside.

On his arrival at the royal court he greeted the King explaining, ‘I have come straight from the battle, which, fortunately, was won without bloodshed’. On 30 October 1922, 50,000 Blackshirts interspersed with regular army forces paraded in front of their leader and the King. The real ‘March on Rome’, which was to go down in Fascist history as the heroic revolution by which they had seized power, was only completed in the aftermath of Mussolini’s appointment as Prime Minister.

The Italian Economy

On coming to power in 1922 Mussolini inherited an economically poor and divided Italy. Thereafter Mussolini sought to consolidate his own power and instigate an autarkical economic system that would provide a basis for future military expansion. To this end a series of economic strategies was adopted to increase the prosperity of the Italian nation, whilst winning support and respect from abroad.

The Battle for the Lira was designed to strengthen the value of the lira, from 150 lire to the pound sterling in 1927 to 90, and reduce the impact of steady inflation that had been hampering economic growth. But economic pride in the currency was also a factor. Although the artificial resurgence of the lira demonstrated the authority of the regime and increased international prestige, the economic ramifications of the policy were miscalculated. The price of Italian goods abroad increased exponentially, thus harming exports and causing further deflation of the currency as international markets sought to compensate. Living standards for Italians were reduced following a 20 per cent cut in wages imposed in 1932, increasing poverty among the northern population. Although ostensibly the immediate propaganda gains of the Battle for the Lira were high, the policy lacked foresight and ultimately hampered Italian industry.

In an effort to adapt the Italian economy to the needs of a future war, the Fascist Party attempted to reduce Italian dependence on imports. The Battle for Grain, launched in 1925, imposed high tariffs on imported foreign cereal goods, whilst government subsidies were made available to assist in the purchasing of machinery and fertilisers. In the decade from 1925 wheat imports fell by 75 per cent, and by 1940 the country almost achieved complete self-sufficiency in cereals. However, these economic gains came at a great price, as exports fell and the importation of fertilisers failed to keep pace. The propaganda and agricultural benefits of the Battle for Grain were soon outweighed by a decline in the quality of the Italian diet, and a further reduction in standards of living, especially in the poorer south.

The third of Mussolini’s economic battles was the Battle of the Marshes, designed to increase the availability of agricultural land, demonstrate Fascist dynamism, and provide employment. The scheme was introduced in 1923. Huge swaths of previously uninhabitable and malarial marsh land in areas such as the Pontine Marshes were drained, whilst the newly created cities of Aprilla, Latina and Sabaudia won the regime international praise. ‘Fascist land reclamation is not only defence against malaria,’ proclaimed a Fascist textbook in 1938, ‘it is the new duty of the state.’ In reality, however, the scheme had only mixed success. Only 80,000 hectares were reclaimed, not one-sixth the area of Italy, as the government insisted.

In total, the Fascist intervention in the economy resulted in some gains, including an overall decrease in levels of unemployment to only 12,000 by 1938. However, the propaganda victories did not reflect the dire economic situation brought about by unwise, unplanned, and disorganised forays into economics from 1925 onwards.

Italian Women

Social policy under the Fascist Party was designed to foster a strong militaristic nation, which would provide the necessary manpower to help Italy achieve her perceived imperial destiny. Mussolini insisted that ‘Women’s place, in the present as in the past, is in the home’, a view that was responsible for his campaign to reduce the number of women in the workforce and increase the total population. In 1933 the state imposed quota restrictions on public sector firms, stating that women must constitute less than a tenth of the workforce; later, in 1938, this limit was extended to all Italian registered companies. The ideal Fascist woman was deemed to be well-rounded and mature, unlike the contemporary image of beauty expounded by Hollywood in the 1930s. Indeed the Italo-American historian Gaetano Salvemini described the Fascist campaign to enforce a ‘traditional’ role for women as ‘The Battle for Fat’. However, in reality the Fascist regime had to accept the position of women in the workplace as a cultural and economic necessity. Though the percentage of women in the total workforce decreased in 1921-36, the percentage of women employed in industry actually increased, from 23.6 per cent to 24.1.

The Battle for Births aimed to increase Italy’s population to 60 million by 1950. Propaganda campaigns, improved health care, financial rewards and ceremonial prizes were designed to cajole the Italian people into having more children. Following an initially unsuccessful period, draconian legislation was passed in order to increase the pressure on families to bear offspring. In 1931 the Italian Penal Code included ‘crimes against the wholeness and health of the race’ which victimised bachelors in particular. Yet birth rates continued to decline, and although the population rose to 45 million in 1940, by 1950 population levels were 12.5 million short of the Fascist target. It seems that Fascist policies towards women were inherently flawed.

Education

In order to consolidate the position of Fascism, Mussolini instigated a programme of indoctrination through education and youth organisations. Pictures of Mussolini were provided in all Italian classrooms, whilst students recited the Fascist Creed twice daily, repeating the phrase ‘I believe in the genius of Mussolini and in our Holy Father Fascism’. In 1928 a single government-approved textbook was introduced in all schools, with classes in military training and Fascist culture commencing in 1938. From 1925 employment laws were passed that enabled the regime to control teachers and other educational workers. The obligatory swearing of an oath of loyalty, in addition to the wearing of Fascist uniform, was introduced from 1931, further consolidating Fascism within Italian society.

With the exception of education, youth organisations were the most successful method of inculcating Fascist values in Italian children. The Opera Nazionale Balilla consisted of numerous sub-groups and organised sporting, adventurous and military activities for children aged six to 18. By 1929 roughly 60 per cent of the northern youth were members, though the proportion was considerably less in the south. Although it is certainly true that many activities undertaken by the ONB gave numerous Italian children opportunities that would otherwise have not have been available, the introduction of compulsory membership in 1935 catalysed the development of a climate of resentment and disillusionment surrounding Fascist youth organisations. Furthermore the ideological impact of such groups is difficult to assess given the prevalence of opposition youth movements, such as the Catholic Boy Scouts. The rapidity at which support for Fascism disappeared following the overthrow of Mussolini in 1943 is clearly relevant here.

The establishment of the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro in 1925 illustrates the totalitarian aspirations of the regime. The OND provided leisure facilities and financial assistance to those members of the Italian public who were deemed in need. The subsidised holidays and excursions offered demonstrated an unparalleled national and international propaganda coup for the Fascist Party. However, despite initial success, shown through impressive membership figures of 3.8 million in 1939, the gains made were not consolidated efficiently. As John Whittam states, the OND was ‘so popular precisely because it enabled millions of Italians to enjoy resources without the obligation of any full commitment to Fascist ideals and practice.’

Foreign Policy and War

Mussolini had set out his foreign policy aims and objectives early in his tenure in power: he wished to increase Italian influence in the Balkans, Mediterranean, and West Africa, in addition to achieving a comparable international standing to that held by Britain and France. The early years of his regime can be regarded as a success; he began to establish Italy as a great nation, whilst tentatively extending her influence into Albania through satellite rulers such as Ahmed Zog. However, as European relations deteriorated in the years preceding World War Two, the position of Italian Fascism began to appear increasingly untenable in an internationally hostile climate. A series of diplomatic miscalculations, including the negative political and humanitarian impact of the war with Abyssinia and his failure to correctly judge the Franco-British response to his imperial posturing, served ultimately to drive Mussolini into an alliance with Adolf Hitler and future conflict.

Throughout the Fascist period the Italian armed forces were glorified and revered, but the reality was very different. With the onset of war in 1939, Italian military resources were severely lacking: 35 of the 80 army divisions were equipped with rifles from 1891; the army had only 1,500 tanks and they could only be supplied with five months’ of fuel; and the Italian Fiat CR42 Fighter was comparatively outdated and technologically inferior to other aeroplanes. When Chief of Army Staff Graziani complained in May 1940 that there were only 1.3 million rifles, many without bayonets, despite Mussolini’s boast of 8 million, the Duce told him not to worry as the army was merely intended for show. The woeful inadequacy of the Italian military when compared to similar European nations was a direct consequence of a complete lack of investment by the Fascist regime. Mussolini preferred to maintain a small and perfectly attired force in order to impress foreign dignitaries, such as Hitler during his visit of May 1938, rather than support a large and expensive force.

The Church

The Lateran Pacts of 1929 ended the 70 year dispute between Church and state and, in the eyes of many Italians, represent the dominant achievement of Mussolini and the Fascist Party. Under the Lateran Pacts the Church was granted sovereignty over the Vatican City in addition to being allowed limited powers in state affairs, whilst Pope Pius XI recognised the Italian state as a legitimate entity.

The importance of the Lateran Pacts both to the longevity of the regime and the level of support it received from at home and abroad should not be under-estimated. Mussolini was hailed as ‘restoring the might of earthly authority to Il Papa’. Yet although the rift between Church and state appeared to have been healed, the alliance could not endure. The increasing radicalisation of the Fascist Party brought swift condemnation from the Vatican, as displayed in the conflict over rival youth groups Catholic Action and the ONB. As the social and economic situation within Italy deteriorated in the late 1930s, open criticism from the Church became more common, with the Pope issuing the encyclical Non Abbiamoso Biscogno and other inflammatory material in the Vatican newspaper L’Osservatore Romano. As Italian society sank into turmoil, the omnipresent Church grew into a formidable force of opposition that would fatally damage the reputation of the Fascist Party and Mussolini within Italy.

Conclusion

Italian Fascism undoubtedly had a number of isolated successes, which to this day remain an impressive achievement. From 1922 until the beginning of the 1940s the Fascist Party, and specifically the leadership of Benito Mussolini, facilitated the development of an Italian nation more unified than at any other time in its history. Mussolini succeeded, to an extent, in repairing the inequalities and disparities that had marred Italian politics since 1870. However, time and time again the Fascist State failed to properly deliver on a wealth of issues, from the social to the military. Policies and initiatives were put in place merely for the sake of doing so, in the hope of achieving Mussolini’s aim of making Italy ‘great, respected and feared’. Legislation and schemes were continually neglected causing their potential to be lost, and any minor victories to be squandered.

The Fascists’ popularity can be attributed to their perceived implementation of numerous socially and economically revolutionary policies that appeared to signal the dawn of a new age for Italy. Yet the public perception of the regime was a far cry from the reality, and in this sense Italian Fascism represented a clear case of ‘style over substance’. Ultimately, Mussolini’s attempt to secure his position within Italy and Europe through propaganda alone led to the disintegration of the Italian nation with the onset of World War II, and the eventual death of Italian Fascism.

Further Reading

• John Whittam, Fascist Italy (1995)
• Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire (1977) and Mussolini (1981)
• R.J.B. Bosworth, Mussolini (2002) and Mussolini’s Italy (2005)
• L. Villari, Foreign Policy under Mussolini (1956)
• Benito Mussolini, Fascism, Doctrine and Institutions (1934)
• Gaetano Salvemini, Under the Axe of Fascism (1936)
• M. Gallo, Mussolini’s Italy (1974)
• Nicholas Farrell, Mussolini: A New Life (2003)

Thomas Meakin is the winner of the Julia Wood Prize 2007.