The March To The Marne: The French Army 1871-1914

Historians already familiar with the standard works of such scholars as Montheilet, Michon, Girardet, Challener and Ralston may be excused for believing that they have grasped the essential features of the place of the Army in the Third French Republic between 1871 and 1914. Dr Porch, however, thinks otherwise and in this well-organised and forceful study he seeks to revise previous interpretations on several significant points.

His main quarrel is with the post-1910 'nation in arms' school who attributed the enormous casualties of 1914 and 1915 to the ascendancy of the professional army which, smarting under its temporary setbacks following the Dreyfus affair, insisted on the implementation of its myopic doctrine of the all-out offensive in rejection of the Radicals' reliance on the reservists and a defensive strategy. In order to show why this version is erroneous, Dr Porch justifiably considers it necessary to explore French civil-military relations before the Dreyfus affair; indeed he deftly sketches the fluctuating fortunes of the Army since the Revolution, and for good measure adds a brilliant chapter on the French colonial experience.